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Abstract 
Despite significant advances in strengthening post-disaster recovery efforts, misaligned strategy and 
inefficient resource allocation are far too often the norm for infrastructure reconstruction. To examine 
the inter-organizational networks that form to coordinate resources for infrastructure reconstruction, 
we employed social network analysis in nineteen communities in the Philippines following Super 
Typhoon Haiyan, at six months and twelve months post-disaster. To build these networks, we 
analyzed interview, field observation and documentation data collected from non-governmental 
organizations, local governments and communities. A survey questionnaire was also administered to 
organizations working in selected communities to validate networks. Results from network analysis 
established that information was the most commonly shared resource by organizations, followed by 
financial, material and human resources. Government agencies had the highest actor centralities; 
however, qualitative data suggests that these roles were the result of obligatory consultations by 
international organizations and lacked legitimacy in practice. Findings further demonstrate that 
networks become more decentralized over time as actors leave and roles become more established, 
influenced by short-term expatriate contracts and the termination of United Nations supported cluster 
coordination. Findings could help organizations strengthen humanitarian response efforts by 
attending to resource allocation and knowledge sharing with other organizations. 
Keywords: coordination, disaster recovery, social network analysis 
Introduction 
Disaster recovery lies beyond the capacity of single organizations and requires coordinated efforts 
(Balcik et al. 2010; Kapucu et al. 2010a). These extreme events bring together diverse organizations 
that must work together to aid communities on their path to recovery. Managing disaster recovery 
processes is therefore complex, as it requires coordination with organizations who follow different 
norms and practices in rapidly evolving contexts that are spread across geographic regions (Chen et 
al. 2008). Moreover, the inherent characteristics of disasters challenge the capabilities of routine 
communication systems (Kapucu 2006). Effective coordination amongst these organizations can 
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reduce financial burdens, alleviate staffing deficiencies and improve service delivery (Balcik et al. 2010). 
The consequences of ineffective or failed coordination are high, as the absence of coordination can 
lead to wasted resources, unnecessary redundancy of service provision or failed reconstruction 
projects (Ritchie and Tierney 2011). 
Despite the important role of coordination (Drabek 2002), there remain significant gaps in 
understanding the resources that are coordinated within inter-organizational networks. In particular, 
recent shifts in multi-lateral aid policy have changed the landscape of coordination in emerging 
economies following disaster events. The introduction of the United Nations humanitarian cluster 
system in 2005 provided an institutional framework that could be used across events (Steets et al. 
2010). Composed of eleven sectors, the clusters are formalized coordinating bodies that are led by a 
pre-designated agency, such as the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) for the water, sanitation & hygiene (WASH) cluster. Upon deployment, clusters typically 
remain active for short periods (less than 2 years), but play an influential role in disseminating 
knowledge and information to organizations. Efforts include tracking programs that center on the 
‘3Ws’ – who, what and where. Coordination of expertise is a central tenant that appears through direct 
(in-person) and indirect (published material) communication. 
The introduction of cluster coordination has altered how organizations engage in coordination 
activities. We lack an understanding of coordination practice under the humanitarian cluster system, 
including the types of resources that are coordinated across organizations and the types of actors that 
take on central coordination roles. A better understanding of this post-disaster coordination practice 
will help us enhance theory on how coordination impacts recovery. Further, disasters are often studied 
through the lens of a single period of time, yet we know that coordination practice and recovery efforts 
are dynamic and evolve over time. It is therefore critical to understand how coordination networks 
evolve and change over time in the recovery process. As such, we propose three research questions: 
1. What types of resources are most frequently shared in post-disaster inter-
organizational networks? 
2. What actors are most central in post-disaster inter-organizational networks? 
3. How do post-disaster inter-organizational networks change during early recovery? 
We address the first two questions by examining networks that form to coordinate different resources 
using social network analysis. Social network analysis also enabled us to identify which actors take on 
central roles in coordination activities. To answer the third question, we analyzed and compared 
networks within the same communities at two different time periods during the recovery process, the 
first at six months post-disaster, and the second at twelve months post-disaster. Our questions focused 
on early recovery efforts within the first twelve months following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, 
after emergency aid (e.g. tents and food), as this stage involved the most critical decisions that will 
contribute toward long term development.  
Disaster Recovery 
Each disaster that strikes a community impacts social, economic and infrastructure systems. 
Communities, governments and organizations employ varying approaches to deliver aid and 
reconstruct infrastructure following these events. Scholars have proposed four post-disaster phases 
that include: (1) mitigation (e.g. reduction in hazard vulnerability); (2) preparedness (e.g. early warning, 
disaster management planning); (3) response (e.g. search, rescue, debris removal and emergency 
housing); and (4) recovery (e.g. developmental reconstruction to enhance future resilience) (Berke et 
al. 1993; Mileti 1999; O’Brien et al. 2010). These stages are helpful in conceptualizing the time scale 
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of reconstruction, but we acknowledge, along with other researchers (e.g. Smith and Wenger 2006), 
that recovery is a non-linear, complex process. The response phase has long been a core tenant of 
disaster management theory (Drabek 1985), yet there is an increasingly fuzzy boundary of the recovery 
phase into other fields of study. Rather than view the fields of disaster management and project 
management as disjointed, we echo recent calls in literature to study their intersection (e.g. Ingirige 
2016) in order to better theorize on the impact of project management in the disaster process cycle. 
Coordination in Disaster Recovery 
Scholars have made significant strides towards a unified understanding of factors that expedite, or 
hinder, recovery. One important factor that has emerged is coordination of stakeholders (Jordan et al. 
2016; Quarantelli 1997). We define coordination here as Drabek (2007) did, the process of social and 
material interactions among interdependent organizations that share a common goal of community 
recovery. Coordination of actors serves to unify strategy (Jahre and Jensen 2010), reduce duplication 
of services (Nolte et al. 2012) and reduce the waste of resources (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). The 
product of coordination is theorized to produce faster recovery times for communities and deliver 
infrastructure with greater functionality. This first point of temporality is of particular importance in 
post-disaster humanitarian contexts. Temporal coordination can be thought of as the “process structure 
imposed to intervene and direct the pattern, timing, and content of communication in a group” (Montoya-Weiss et al. 
2001). Past studies have focused on this important characteristic of coordination, suggesting that 
different phases of response and recovery require different information, equipment and management 
skills (Comfort 2004), although these models need validation through longitudinal and empirical 
evidence of coordination practice.  
While there are sparse examples of the impact of successful post-disaster coordination, there are an 
abundance of examples that demonstrate the failings when coordination does not occur (Jordan et al. 
2015), including fragmented service delivery and the inefficient allocation of resources. Thus, there is 
a need to better understand and unpack coordination as it occurs in practice, including identifying 
what resources are coordinated, how coordination networks are formed and what structure these 
networks take, to eventually analyze how coordination practice influences the success or failure of 
recovery efforts. Unfortunately, while coordination frameworks within management are robust (e.g. 
Jarzabkowski et al. 2012), coordination theory within the disaster context is still in its infancy. There 
is a need to specifically understand coordination in the disaster context, which differs from 
coordination in organizations. The disaster context is set apart because sudden and unexpected events 
create a context of unpredictability (Kapucu et al. 2010a; Salmon et al. 2011), which increases 
uncertainty. The foremost uncertainty is disasters themselves, as they vary by nature, location, timing 
and intensity (Balcik et al. 2010). Uncertainty also continues to persist as recovery operations evolve 
from new and changing information, task flows, organizational structures, the political environment 
and post-disaster funding levels (Chen et al. 2008). In addition, disaster coordination heavily diverges 
from coordination in other contexts due to time pressures to deliver services (Faraj and Xiao 2006, 
Abbasi and Kapucu 2012). This leads to fast decision making, where mistakes can be catastrophic and 
poses constraints on responders’ capabilities to act and analyze coordination problems (Chen et al. 
2008). Finally, the contractual nature of delivering infrastructure through the humanitarian system 
means that organizations have a short term presence in contexts, differing from other organizational 
environments where there is a long-term presence. 
Effective coordination amongst organizations assisting in disaster recovery is crucial, as critical 
decisions must be made to allocate resources in a rapidly changing, dynamic environment (Kapucu 
2006). Meeting resource demand with supply is of particular concern in disaster relief activities. For 
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example, one third of the relief containers delivered after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami continued 
to be blocked at airport customs five months after the disaster, resulting in severe delays in delivering 
service provision to affected communities (Balcik et al. 2010). While coordination activities surface to 
address the challenge of resource scarcity, the arrival of numerous organizations simultaneously 
confounds the complexity of allocating resources (Quarantelli 1997). While commonly coordinated 
resources have been classified into categories that include material (e.g. equipment, transportation), 
human (e.g. labor workforce), information (e.g. expertise, contacts) and financial (e.g. joint funding 
projects) resources (Chen et al. 2008; Frimpong et al. 2003; Jahre and Jensen 2010), we do not yet 
know which of these resources are coordinated and shared most frequently, which would allow us to 
identify potential inefficiencies in resource allocation.  
Cluster Coordination 
Disaster coordination has evolved over the last decade. To date, the literature has largely focused on 
emergency response activities, with a dearth of research as to how coordination occurs in later 
recovery stages and the influence of coordination on recovery outcomes. The earliest traces of 
formalized, modern humanitarian coordination come from the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 46/182, dating back to December of 1991. In these early efforts to coordinate, the United 
Nations, in partnership with the national government of the affected country, was designated as the 
central actor in charge of coordination. Following early organizational theorists, traditional centralized 
structure was anticipated to lead to more effective coordination of activities, however empirical 
examples (e.g. Kellogg et al. 2006) provide evidence of decentralized behavior as the dominant force 
in organizational action. A shift occurred in 2005, when the humanitarian cluster system was 
introduced. The clusters, while still highly structured, transitioned away from central control towards 
guidance and collective action on behalf of responding organizations, paralleling the grassroots 
movement in development (Willis 2011). Clusters are led by one, or in some cases two, lead 
organizations when activated, but receive support from the United Nations Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). For example, the Shelter Cluster is typically headed but the 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). There is a dearth of research that has analyzed coordination under the cluster 
system. Research is needed to identify how the cluster system has influenced resource coordination 
amongst organizations, and how, through longitudinal analysis, the eventual end of the cluster system 
influences later resource coordination.  
Governmental Agencies 
Government agencies typically assume a lead role in coordination of recovery efforts, although the 
extent of their role often differs between developed and emerging countries. Past shortcomings of 
government managed reconstruction programs in developing countries (e.g. Powell 2011) point to the 
need to re-conceptualize the role of these organizations in recovery schemes. Government agencies 
differ from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations bodies in that 
they are permanently embedded within the social fabric of communities. Therefore, governments 
often have higher social capital with affected populations and can draw from established channels of 
communication  (Kapucu et al. 2010b). However, these governmental agencies are typically heavily 
bureaucratic and often lack the flexibility required in quick response scenarios. In some regions, these 
agencies may also fail to possess necessary experience and knowledge required to manage emergencies 
effectively. Moreover, intergovernmental relationships are known to include poor consensus among 
actors, low levels of trust, contested authority and limited capacity for external actor participation 
(Kapucu et al. 2010a), which are obvious barriers to coordination. There is therefore a need to better 
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understand the central actors that coordinate recovery efforts in post-disaster environments and how 
government agencies strengthen, or conversely limit, coordination in international responses.  
Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a methodology used to analyze social structures by conceptualizing 
social relationships as interconnected networks of actors (El‐Sheikh and Pryke 2010). Networks are 
geometric constructions made from sets of items called vertices with connections between them called 
edges. In sociology, vertices are named actors and edges are called ties (Newman 2003). The fundamental 
purpose of social network analysis is to model relationships between actors and depict the structure 
of a social group through mathematical and graphical methods by measuring the number, the path 
and the strength of those ties (Pryke 2012; Wasserman and Faust 1994). From multiple available 
metrics, researchers can analyze network structures, how an actor is embedded within a social structure 
and how a social structure emerges from the micro-relations between actors (Kapucu 2005). In 
addition, graphical representations of networks can be generated which assist in visualizing network 
mechanics. Social network analysis can be used at two levels of analysis: (1) actor level or (2) network 
level. At the actor level, properties or attributes (e.g. age of an individual or organization) can be 
analyzed for their impact on ties and network traits. Properties of an entire network, such as 
centralization or density, can be calculated based on the types, and number, of ties connecting actors 
in the network. 
Social Network Analysis in Disaster Coordination 
Abbasi and Kapucu (2012) describe social network analysis as “a theoretical lens and analytical tool for 
discovering the patterns of communications and its dynamics in crisis situations.” Although social network analysis 
is not a new methodology, it is new in disaster research (Varda et al. 2009). As stated by Kapucu et al. 
(2011), social network analysis “offers a unique opportunity to study the complex nature of disaster response.” 
Presently, a limited number of studies have used social network analysis to understand post-disaster 
coordination networks, focusing on interactions among public, private, and nonprofit organizations 
following 9/11 (Kapucu 2005), inter-governmental and inter-organizational response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Kapucu et al. 2010a), evolving organizational response to the cycle of Floridian hurricanes 
(Kapucu et al. 2010b), and emergency responder and governmental collaborations during the 2012 
Korean typhoon season (Jung 2013). As indicated, coordination is key to effective disaster recovery, 
with robust networks seen as being better able to respond promptly and effectively in service delivery 
(Kapucu 2005), and social network analysis can be a useful tool in modeling these interactions. 
While social network analysis reduces and quantifies social structures, it also makes them visible and 
comparable across cases (Pryke 2004, 2005). Moreover, by mapping a visualized network, social 
network analysis can help people and organizations understand their impact and position within a 
network, and highlight reasons of success or failure in organizational strategy. While scholars have 
taken initial steps to use social network analysis in the disaster context, study of resource coordination 
has been narrowly focused (e.g. only information), and further, past analysis has taken a notably static 
understanding of coordination, when in fact disaster literature increasingly emphasizes the dynamic 
nature of recovery efforts. As such, we do not yet know how different coordination network structures 
form and evolve over time, which would help in the identification of how structure and inclusion of 
different types of actors influences long-term recovery efforts.  
In summary, we aim to address the needs identified above by better understanding post-disaster 
coordination of recovery efforts, specifically, the types of resources that are coordinated, the network 
structures that emerge to coordinate these resources and how these structures change over time, 
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attending specifically to which actors are central and how the removal of the cluster system affects 
coordination. To accomplish this, we employ social network analysis, a novel lens through which to 
study coordination in the disaster recovery literature.  
Method 
To answer the proposed questions of what resources are coordinated, who are central actors and how 
do networks change during recovery, we selected to study early recovery efforts of organizations 
responding to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. We employed social network analysis as a means 
to operationalize and compare coordination structures for four different types of resources – material, 
human, information and financial – across nineteen communities at two points in time. Operationalizing 
coordination with social network metrics for different resources at the community level allows for 
comparison across points in time, and, together with the qualitative data, allows us to understand why 
these networks emerged and changed.  
Research Context 
On November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) hit the Philippines with 
wind speeds of 320 km/h and gusts of up to 360 km/h, making it the fourth most intense tropical 
storm ever observed and the strongest to ever make landfall. Haiyan made its first landfall in Guiuan, 
Eastern Samar and crossed the country by heading westward towards Vietnam. In total, nine of the 
seventeen Philippine regions were hit by Haiyan, affecting more than 16 million people, damaging 
(partially or totally) more than 1.1 million houses and causing losses estimated at nearly 900 million 
USD (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance 2014). Due to 
significant damage, housing, water and sanitation infrastructure quickly became key priorities of the 
government and international community in the recovery effort (National Economic and 
Development Authority 2013). We focused on the coordination of resources needed by organizations 
to deliver these infrastructure services in recovery, along with other supporting programs, such as 
livelihood assistance and social development. Examples of supplementary livelihood and social 
programs included boat construction for fishermen and gender-based violence awareness. An example 
of coordination across these sectors included the sharing of schedules and training dates to avoid 
overlap. The delivery of other infrastructure, such as transportation and power, were not included 
because these systems were restored within two months after the typhoon, with long-term investments 
planned at an uncertain time in the future. 
Community Selection 
Administratively, the Philippines is organized by regions, provinces, municipalities, cities and, at the 
smallest administrative division, the barangay. Our unit of analysis focused at the barangay level, or 
community level. We selected communities in consultation with organizations working in the field based 
upon criteria that included: (1) similar socio-economic status, (2) similar degree of damage caused by 
Haiyan, but that may differ in cause (e.g., flood, wind), (3) similar population size and (4) differing 
number of organizations involved in the recovery effort. In total, 19 communities were selected that 
consisted of 6 communities in the province of Cebu, 11 communities in Leyte and 3 communities in 
Eastern Samar. Among the selected communities, 86 organizations carried out 309 total programs. 
We define a program here as a service delivered by a single organization. For example, a WASH (water, 
sanitation and hygiene) program might include various elements such as latrine and water 
construction, but was managed uniformly by an organization, thus constituted a single service. For 
our analysis, we focused on the coordination of organizations involved in the selected communities.  
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Data Collection 
Longitudinal data was collected in three primary forms: (1) semi-structured interviews, (2) 
observations and (3) surveys. The research team collected data within each of the selected 
communities through field visits at approximately six months and twelve months post-disaster. These 
field visits were conducted for three and four months, respectively. Six months was selected for the 
first time period as this immediately followed emergency services and signaled the start of early 
recovery efforts that focused on delivering infrastructure. Twelve months was selected as the second 
time period because this aligned with the completion of planning and design for housing programs, 
coincided with the ongoing construction phase of infrastructure projects and was after the departure 
of the humanitarian cluster system. During the first visit, 32 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with local government officials, NGO officers and community members. Questions aimed 
to understand with whom organizations were coordinating, what was being coordinated and through 
what means. Example questions included: Is your organization currently coordinating rebuilding efforts with 
another NGO, organization or government? and What types of resources are you sharing? During the second field 
visit a similar demographic was targeted for interviews. A total of 167 individuals were interviewed 
during this period. Questions for this period aimed to understand changes that had occurred over the 
first year of recovery and included questions such as: In recent months, how has coordination changed? For 
all local staff and community members interviewed that natively spoke Tagalog, Cebuano or Waray, a 
local translator was provided. Interviews were transcribed and translated into English.  
Additional data included documentation from organizations, government agencies and humanitarian 
clusters. These included meeting minutes from coordination meetings, partnership agreements, 
planning guidelines and other textual sources shared between organizations. Field observations of 
inter-organizational coordination meetings, organizational meetings and informal gatherings were also 
documented extensively with field notes. The duration and scope of the study allowed for the 
researchers to build significant trust with organizations and observe substantial interactions during 
informal settings.  
Due to the complexity associated with dynamic coordination networks in early recovery, we chose to 
build network data from the expansive qualitative data that was collected. Here we argue that 
traditional social network analysis data collection methods (e.g. surveys) would be insufficient to 
capture the entirety of coordination structures due to the dynamic environment, staffing and 
organizational turnover, but can be a means to validate collected data from researcher observations. 
This method represents a novel approach to triangulate qualitative data, which addresses a major 
limitation of traditional social network analysis studies –  their inability to capture complete networks 
(Scott 2012). Addressing the dearth of knowledge on resource coordination in literature, we focused 
on four types of resources previously categorized in coordination practice. These resources included: 
material (e.g. equipment, transportation), human (e.g. labor workforce), information (e.g. expertise, 
contacts) and financial (e.g. joint funding projects). Using interview transcripts, field notes and 
documentation, a list of known organizations working in each of the 19 selected communities was 
compiled. This list was then converted into a matrix format common for network data. The first 
author, who was present during field observations and for all interviews, was then asked to complete 
a matrix for each of the four types of resources coordinated in each of the communities. Separate 
matrices were generated for six months and twelve months. Multiple subsequent passes were 
completed after reviewing collected qualitative data. This generated four resource network matrices 
for each community at six months and four resource network matrices at twelve months that described 
coordination structures. An additional network was compiled for each time period, at six and twelve 
months post-disaster, that combined the number of resources shared. The research team considered 
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undirected ties between actors, implying that the link between actor A to actor B is the same as the 
one linking actor B to actor A. This assumption was used given how the data was generated from 
observation and because a single value from researcher observation allows for more consistent 
evaluation of social relationships between actors.  
Concurrent to the generation of network matrices by the researchers, an online network survey was 
sent to all 86 organizations known to be working in selected communities. These survey questionnaires 
served as a method to validate qualitative network construction by examining a sample of network 
actors and connections. Questions asked general information about the organization's response and 
recovery programs and network questions regarding their coordination with other organizations and 
agencies. The purpose of the surveys was not to generate entire networks, but instead provide a sample 
of organizational responses that could validate researcher generated matrices. The survey asked 
organizations to confirm their presence in the selected communities and identify organizations with 
whom they coordinated at six months and twelve months. For each period, the organization was asked 
to identify what resources (material, human, information or financial) were coordinated. The survey 
was sent to mid-level management staff with experience working in the identified communities. In the 
event that this individual was not able to answer questions regarding inter-organizational coordination, 
a second, or in some cases third, contact was asked to provide responses. Twenty of the 86 
organizations responded to the survey, resulting in a 23% response rate. As these responses covered 
52 of the 309 identified programs, it confirms that collecting social network analysis data through 
surveys would not have been sufficient to capture the entire coordination networks, but can be used 
as a means to validate qualitative data.  
Analysis 
We classified organizations into three different categories: (1) local organizations, (2) international 
organizations and (3) governmental agencies. While important to recovery, we chose to exclude 
community religious entities, such as local churches, as they often played a lesser role in infrastructure 
reconstruction based on field observations. Here, we define local organizations as either organizations 
based in the Philippines or international organizations that had a permanent office in the Philippines. 
In contrast, international organizations are not based in the Philippines. Among the identified governmental 
agencies, only two were considered as being active in infrastructure related activities. The first was the 
Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and was involved in shelter cash 
distribution with its Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) program, as well as in relocation processes. 
The second governmental agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA), was involved in site 
development and financing of relocation sites. 
Based on the collected data matrices, 190 networks were built using Netminer4, social network analysis 
software developed by Cyram. Metrics were calculated at the actor level (degree centrality) and at the 
network level (degree centralization). At the actor level, centrality measures help to determine the 
prominence of an actor in a network. The context of the network in which the actor is embedded will 
determine whether negative or positive influence is associated to prominence in the network (Pryke 
2005). Three types of centralities could have been used in calculations: degree, betweenness and 
closeness. Because we are interested in the activity of an organization within the coordination network, 
we adopted degree centrality, which is considered a measure of the activity of organizations (Freeman 
1978). Degree centrality is defined as the count of the actor’s connections divided by the maximal 
number of potential connections that an actor may hold in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
As suggested by Kapucu et al. (2010a), organizations that have more ties are more powerful and 
advantaged in the network. High degree centrality thus implies higher involvement of an actor in 
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activity with the rest of the network (Pryke 2004). In contrast, betweenness centrality would have been 
used if our focus was on the ability of organizations to connect subgroups, while closeness centrality 
could have been used to examine path dependencies in coordination structures. 
At a network level, the number of connected actors is the number of actors present in a network that 
share at least one tie with others, regardless of the weight that ties may have (e.g. number of resources 
shared). This metric is useful to assess the degree to which organizations in a community share 
resources with others. The density of a network is defined as the number of ties in the network divided 
by the number of possible ties. Its value varies from 0 to 1; where a 0 implies that no actors are 
connected and a 1 represents complete connectivity between all actors in a network. Network density 
is treated as a measure of the overall coordination among the organizations in the network (Topper 
and Carley 1999), which, in our research, can assess how much organizations tend to share particular 
resources with others. Network degree centralization is a relative measure of actor degree centralities 
in relation to the entire network, and varies from 0 (all actors are equal) to 1 (one central actor appears). 
This metric shows if there is one organization that tends to share resources (network degree 
centralization = 1), or if all organizations share the same amount of resources (network degree 
centralization = 0). Note that centralization depends on the number of organizations included in a 
network. In order to allow comparison between communities that have a different number of involved 
organizations, we normalized network centralizations. For each community, the network 
centralization, dependent on the number of actors, was divided by the highest actor degree centrality 
that an actor could have, if it was the only central actor in the community.  
Networks were analyzed with the same number of organizations for both time periods considered. 
This assumption provides greater insight to answer who is central in networks and how they change 
over time. This assumption impacts our analysis in several ways. If an actor was isolated at one of the 
time periods, it suggests that they may either be present without coordinating, or absent from the 
recovery effort during that time period. While our qualitative data can assist in determining the answer 
to this question, both situations are considered the same in the network analysis. Further, if an actor 
joined the recovery effort after six months, they were included as an isolated actor at six months in 
order to keep the number of organizations static, which allows for network metric comparisons. 
As part of the approach used to triangulate qualitative data, we conducted comparison testing between 
the researcher generated matrices and a sample of organizational surveys that were collected. This 
validity check was done by comparing each organization’s survey answer at the actor level with the 
data constructed from researcher observations, interview data and field notes. For a specific resource 
(e.g. information), the number of researcher and organization link disagreements were totaled in each 
community network. For instance, in a community where 14 organizations were identified, one 
organization shares resources with 8 others. If for a specific resource, the organization and the 
researcher were in agreement for all ties except one, the average score would be 0.07 – 1 disagreement 
among 13 potential ties. Note that we consider agreement for both coordination between two actors, 
and the lack of coordination. The same process is repeated for every answer received from each 
organization survey, for each resource, at six months and twelve months. We then calculated the mean 
of these disagreement scores for each community. 
Findings 
For each of the communities studied, we compiled network metrics to answer the three research 
questions, which included identifying what resources are coordinated, what actors are central and how 
networks change over time. We will first present a summary of the networks, resource coordination 
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trends and organizational demographics, followed by our analysis of two different time periods, six 
months and twelve months after the disaster.  
Resource Coordination 
Based on the different types of resources analyzed (material, human, information and financial), social 
network analysis helped identify the most common resources shared. Resource coordination can be 
examined by looking at three metrics: (1) percent of organizations coordinating a resource in a 
network; (2) mean density of network for type of resource; and (3) degree centralization of each 
resource network. We present means at six months and twelve months for all networks in Table 1. 
We will return to discuss these changes in our discussion of network evolution. A summary of key 
metrics for each community are provided in Table 2. 
Table 1: Individual Resource Coordination Networks 
Resources 
Percentage of Organizations 
Coordinating Resource 
Mean Density Mean Degree Centralization 
6 months 1 year Change 6 months 1 year Change 6 months 1 year Change 
Material 28% 16% -42% 0.028 0.016 -44% 0.147 0.109 -26% 
Human 10% 7% -27% 0.009 0.006 -29% 0.076 0.071 -7% 
Information 80% 42% -48% 0.219 0.070 -68% 0.451 0.247 -45% 
Finance 28% 21% -27% 0.029 0.020 -32% 0.133 0.104 -22% 
Table 2: Summary of Combined Resource Network Metrics 
Community 
Number 
of Actors 
Number of 
Connected Actors 
Density 
Degree 
Centralization 
Mean Degree 
Centrality 
6 
months 
12 
months 
6 
months 
12 
months 
6 
months 
12 
months 
6 
months 
12 
months 
1 14 9 8 0.187 0.110 0.043 0.025 0.264 0.132 
2 21 18 11 0.186 0.086 0.163 0.126 0.229 0.119 
3 16 14 10 0.208 0.108 0.173 0.104 0.283 0.142 
4 14 10 6 0.198 0.077 0.139 0.112 0.253 0.121 
5 16 13 6 0.200 0.042 0.204 0.122 0.300 0.075 
6 19 15 7 0.175 0.041 0.174 0.084 0.228 0.070 
7 14 13 8 0.319 0.11 0.157 0.115 0.495 0.187 
8 17 16 7 0.294 0.059 0.129 0.157 0.390 0.096 
9 16 10 6 0.100 0.050 0.071 0.084 0.133 0.083 
10 9 7 2 0.250 0.028 0.055 0.055 0.306 0.056 
11 17 14 10 0.235 0.132 0.121 0.145 0.294 0.206 
12 11 8 5 0.200 0.091 0.110 0.092 0.200 0.164 
13 17 14 7 0.250 0.051 0.106 0.091 0.287 0.096 
14 19 18 5 0.251 0.029 0.217 0.073 0.345 0.058 
15 12 11 5 0.242 0.076 0.107 0.074 0.242 0.091 
16 13 10 4 0.256 0.051 0.139 0.130 0.321 0.103 
17 26 18 12 0.114 0.052 0.182 0.114 0.138 0.083 
18 16 14 7 0.267 0.100 0.251 0.180 0.392 0.192 
19 15 12 4 0.248 0.038 0.165 0.080 0.314 0.057 
 
Combining findings from the percent of organizations sharing a resource, the network density and the 
degree centralization analysis, our findings shows that information was the most frequently shared 
resource, although there is a wide variation in its content. An example of coordinating information 
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was sharing lists of beneficiaries within communities between two or more organizations, or reporting 
the cost of infrastructure being constructed. Information tends to be easier to coordinate as it can be 
shared relatively freely without the need for managerial authorization within organizations. From 
literature, we know that information has the lowest demand on organizations, and is important, but 
can be superficial, lacking the theorized monetary benefits seen in more intensive types of resource 
coordination (Neeraj Jha and Misra 2007). After information resources, organizations tended to share 
material and financial resources with the same ease at six months. These resources are more complicated 
to coordinate as they require administrative mechanisms to put into practice, however, coordinating 
these resources can help eliminate redundancy, particularly in resource-constrained, post-disaster 
environments. Examples of material coordination included sharing tools between reconstruction 
projects in a community, while an example of financial coordination was a mutual donor agency for 
multiple projects within a community. Finally, human resources are seen as the rarest resource shared 
at six months. For many organizations, a skilled workforce was harder to come by than funding. As a 
result, there was a hesitance to coordinate labor and it was common to see wage wars between 
organizations for carpenters and masons. For example, one NGO project manager said, “When the 
foreign NGOs come in they would up the price for labor and materials. So there was an initial, shall I say, there was 
an initial dislocation of the pricing scheme. It got abnormally high for the projects. So how to deal with that?” 
All of the resources analyzed faced a decrease in coordination between organizations over time, using 
mean density and mean degree centralization as a proxy. Although information is the most shared 
resource, it faced the highest decrease over time – a 68% mean network density loss. Following initial 
program planning, there was less uncertainty and information demand as organizations solidified 
infrastructure designs. Material and financial resources had less density loss over time, with financial 
coordination 32% lower and material coordination 44% lower at twelve months than six months. 
Finally, human resources, was 29% lower at twelve months when compared to six months. This serves 
to answer our first research question which asked what resources are most frequently coordinated in 
post-disaster inter-organizational networks. 
Analyzing the types of resources coordinated highlights the need to better understand how materials 
and, in particular, human resources, can be coordinated and shared more effectively in resource 
constrained environments. The inefficiencies that resulted in a lack of coordination, including price 
escalation and ‘poaching’ trained labor from other organizations, caused schedule delays and increased 
costs which ultimately resulted in scope reduction or unfinished projects. Furthermore, while we 
certainly expect coordination channels to consolidate over time, the rapid decrease in network density 
demonstrates the magnitude of resource coordination drop-off. The consequences of this drop 
resulted in higher rates of duplication of services after twelve months, in one case leading to entire 
communities receiving two or three iterations of shelter.  
Centrality of Organizations 
Local organizations 
To address our second research question, which asked who are the most central actors in post-disaster 
inter-organizational networks. We will discuss themes that emerged for local organizations and then 
government agencies. Among the 86 organizations identified in the considered communities: 38% 
were local, 49% international and 13% had an unidentified origin. This latter percentage may seem 
high, but these organizations only accounted for 4% of the 309 programs analyzed, which 
demonstrates the limited role of these organizations in the recovery effort. They were most frequently 
small local churches whose presence was temporary and had limited input in the recovery process 
(mainly food distribution at early stages). On the other hand, local organizations, while a minority, 
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carry out over half of all the identified programs among communities. This suggests that local 
organizations tend to be involved in communities more than international organizations, who may 
focus their attention on a smaller number of communities.  
Network metrics provide additional support for local organizations’ important role in coordination. 
At six months, local organizations had a mean degree centrality of 0.297 in comparison to 0.267 for 
international organizations. At twelve months, mean degree centralities decreased to 0.154 for local 
organizations and to 0.068 for international organizations. Using a two-sample t-test, we find that 
there was not, however, a statically significant difference between international organization centrality 
(M= 0.267, SD= 0.217) and local organization centrality (M= 0.297, SD= 0.306) at six months; t (296)=-
0.960, p=0.338. There was a statistically significant difference between international organization 
centrality (M= 0.068, SD= 0.129) and local organization centrality (M= 0.154, SD= 0.196), however, 
at twelve months; t(296)=-0.960, p=0.000. This suggests local organizations tend to take a more central 
role in longer term resource coordination, perhaps because of more effective allocation, and 
consolidation, of resources over time. For example, one NGO staff member said, “Implementation 
according to our guidelines may change according to how we see the needs of the community and also the needs and 
capacities of our teams. …and then we’re looking with the resources that we still have. We still have savings under our 
administrative cost, particularly on salaries… so we modify the budget.” Local organizations had a resurgent need 
to coordinate with excess funding, whereas international organizations did not have a need to 
reallocate resources as their program budgets were more rigid. Aligning with past theory, which 
suggests that coordination demands may change as recovery progresses (Comfort 2004), our findings 
also suggest that resource coordination demands may be different for local and international 
organizations. 
Government Agencies 
Only two governmental agencies were considered to be active in infrastructure reconstruction; each 
had fundamentally different behaviors in coordination practice. The Department for Social Welfare 
and Development (DSWD) was active in all of the studied communities and had a recurrent central 
role, while the National Housing Authority (NHA) was only present in 26% of communities and had 
a more limited role. DSWD was present in all of the 19 considered communities at six months, and 
in 89% of communities at twelve months. Further, in all but five of the communities, DSWD was the 
most central actor at both six and twelve months. As a general trend, centralities of this governmental 
agency decreased over time, but its relative importance remained the same as other organizations’ 
centralities decreased. Our analysis showed that government agencies’ involvement in communities 
depends largely on their approach and mandate. From the two agencies considered, DSWD was more 
active at the regional level, which trickled down to involvement at the community scale. NHA was 
focused at the national level, and its involvement was limited to a few relocation sites. 
From the qualitative data collected, however, these coordination efforts were limited. For instance, 
DSWD tended to receive information, but did little to reciprocate. NGOs commonly felt that it was 
obligatory to contact the local government, in this case DSWD, but these exchanges often lacked any 
real discourse. In contrast, the government organizations were often fearful of losing support from 
NGOs if they criticized their actions. Therefore, despite occupying a central role in our network 
analysis, government agencies held a misaligned role with practice. Exchanges between government 
agencies and NGOs were also compounded by misunderstandings in technical language and jargon 
used to coordinate. For example, a newly hired Filipino NGO worker said, “Actually I had to look up 
what a core shelter looks like and so I say that, oh, this shelter is the core shelter!” This sentiment about naming 
conventions and function of the cluster system was common to almost all newcomers. 
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When we compared the role of government agencies with UNOCHA, the organization responsible 
for supporting cluster coordination, we found that DSWD held a higher centrality at both time periods 
analyzed. We use network metrics of UNOCHA here to represent cluster coordination as this 
organization was responsible for cluster reporting and provides a means to assess overall cluster 
trends. A comparison of mean degree centralities from government agencies, UNOCHA and all other 
organizations is shown in Table 3. Interestingly, NHA’s centrality was opposite other actors, and 
slightly increased over time. This is likely because in-situ construction by other organizations started 
more quickly and NHA’s projects commonly required development of new relocation sites which 
inherently took more time to plan. 
Table 3: Mean Degree Centrality Comparison 
 6 Months 12 Months 
DSWD 0.734 0.453 
NHA 0.187 0.202 
UNOCHA 0.534 - 
All Organizations 0.346 0.257 
 
While governmental agencies were central actors at six months, an interesting trend emerged in their 
network role at twelve months – they were commonly positioned between two isolated sub-groups in 
the networks. Thus, despite limited authority at six months, these early connections led to their 
continued role to link organizations at twelve months. To demonstrate this, we have illustrated the 
community network of organizations for case 17 at six and twelve months in Figure 1. DSWD, circled, 
is central at six months and has a large number of connections, having a degree centrality of 0.500. At 
twelve months DSWD’s resource coordination activity drops, holding a degree centrality of 0.167, but 
the agency spans two observable subgroups. If DSWD was not present in the coordination network 
at twelve months, four of the NGOs located at the bottom of the network would have been 
completely disconnected. This suggests that while early coordination may not involve the government 
in substantial dialogue, these organizations play an important role in long term linkages. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of Government Agencies on Coordination 
It is worth noting that DSWD was present in every community, therefore, the impact of limited 
government involvement cannot be discussed. By analyzing densities of networks, however, it appears 
that communities where DSWD was not central have a higher than average density at six months, and 
a lower than average density at twelve months. Therefore, these communities face the highest change 
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of density over time. Whereas there is debate in the literature on whether governmental agencies 
should take central coordinating roles in recovery efforts (Kapucu et al. 2010b; Powell 2011), this 
analysis suggests that governmental agencies do have an essential role in long-term resource 
coordination. It also implies that while the lack of a central governmental agency can be advantageous 
in the short-term, as it is associated with additional connections between potential actors, this lack of 
central government agency can be detrimental to long-term coordination when these connections are 
lost. In summary, we found that government agencies tend to be the most central actors during both 
time periods. International organizations have higher centralities over local organizations at six 
months and, conversely, local organizations have higher centralities than international organizations 
at twelve months, answering our second research question. 
Network Evolution 
Based upon the longitudinal network analysis, we present results for network evolution through the 
following metrics: network centralization, actor centralities, densities and number of connected 
organizations. The mean actor centrality of the combined resource networks was found to decrease 
by 26% over time. We also analyzed the change in the number of shared resources over time, which 
showed that the total number of resources shared decreases by 60% between the two periods 
examined. The centrality changes and the decrease in the number of resources shared suggest that 
organizations are less active over time.  
Decentralization in Networks 
Across all communities, no networks had degree centralizations that exceeded 0.5 at six or twelve 
months. As centralizations may vary from 0 to 1, 0.5 can be considered as the threshold at which 
networks begin to have a dominant, central organization within the community; while a value of 1 
would indicate a single central actor in a community. Small degree centralization scores also support 
the absence of a single dominant organization being more active within networks. While previous 
theories (Balcik et al. 2010) argue that networks tend to become more centralized over time following 
a disaster, a mean centralization decrease of 27% was observed in networks over time. This indicates 
that networks may have been more centralized during the early recovery effort phase, but that they 
tend to become more decentralized over time. This led to relatively few organizations dictating 
construction guidelines at approximately six months and collective networks trying to enforce these 
standards at twelve months, resulting in weak adoption of standards. A summary of the normalized 
network centralizations is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Normalized Degree Centralization of Combined Resource Networks 
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Several communities are exceptions to the primary trend of decentralization. For instance, community 
1 had a resource degree centralization that was very low at both time periods. While this community 
had a number of shelter programs, all actors participated in a similar way, and no one actor took a 
central, leading role. On the other hand, in community 14, the degree centralization is very high at six 
months compared to other networks. As a relocation site, one primary NGO took a central role in 
infrastructure delivery where there was an absence of other organizations. The other communities that 
were relocation sites included numbers 7, 11 and 17. While a comparison of relocation and in-situ 
sites is an important topic in recovery, it is beyond the scope of this study to compare these differences. 
Change of Central Organizations 
To determine if the central organizational actors remained the same or changed over time, we analyzed 
which organizations were central at each period of time. From the 309 programs carried out by 
organizations within the 19 communities, only 54 programs could be considered as controlled by a 
central organization. These 54 central programs were carried out by 21 of the 86 identified 
organizations. This result is surprisingly low as it implies that only 21% of organizations play a central 
role in coordination practice. Of the 54 different central programs, only 5 of them (9%) are occupied 
by the same organization at six months and twelve months. This reaffirms the dynamic nature of 
networks and that key positions evolve over time. For example, in community 17, the central 
organizational actor was active in only this community but had programs in multiple sectors, including 
shelter, WASH, protection and disaster risk reduction (DRR). The organization focused its efforts on 
cross-sector infrastructure programming and placed resources toward embedding themselves into this 
one community. As a result, they maintained their centrality over time within the community.  
 
Figure 3: Central Actor Shifts in Resource Coordination Networks 
Returning to our previous analysis of government agencies and UNOCHA, community 11 highlights 
trends seen in these shifts, shown in Figure 3. A total of 17 organizations were involved in this 
community. DSWD is highlighted on the left, UNOCHA in the center and NHA on the right. In this 
instance we can see that there was a shift of the network from UNOCHA as the primary central actor 
at six months to DSWD at twelve months, resulting in a profound shift in network ties. At six months, 
network density is 0.235, while at twelve months it drops to 0.132, illustrating the impact of central 
actor changes. Moreover, normalized degree centralization is 0.121 at six months and increases to 
0.145 at twelve months. These networks clearly show how the coordination core moves in the face of 
changing central actors. This change was likely driven by the departure of the cluster system at twelve 
months.  
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Disconnected Networks Over Time 
The mean density of networks at six months was 0.220, which implies that on average, 22% of possible 
ties exist. The maximum density observed was 0.319 At twelve months, the mean density of networks 
decreased to 0.070. The densities started low at six months and tended to decrease over time. Here 
we will only discuss the combined resource networks, however individual resource networks were 
observed to follow similar trends. A density decrease might come from two possible factors: (1) a 
decrease of the number of ties, or (2) increase of the number of isolated actors, which implies an 
increase of the number of potential ties. The number of resources coordinated had a mean density 
decrease of 66%, although a decrease of more than 85 % is seen in three communities. The origin of 
the decrease is due to both a 66% decrease in the number of ties and due to an increase of the number 
of isolated actors, on average 39%, in communities.  
Findings show that coordination networks become more decentralized over time. In general, this is 
seen as a positive trait, as the removal of a central actor can be detrimental to collective decision-
making. However, the studied coordination networks show that the departure of key organizations, 
even ones that do not appear central, can have a profound impact on continued communication, and 
potentially, the long-term resilience and sustainability of the recovery effort. This was observed in the 
dramatic drop in network densities across all communities. Among the organizations that left the 
recovery effort shortly before twelve months, the most significant was the departure of the cluster 
coordination bodies. These entities provided institutional support for coordination efforts and 
established norms for organizations to engage in resource sharing at early stages of the recovery effort. 
In particular, UNOCHA, whose mandate is to support humanitarian coordination, departed shortly 
before the twelve-month period studied. This is significant because of the twenty communities 
studied, all had significant ongoing infrastructure reconstruction. UNOCHA was involved in all the 
communities, and although they had a central role in only three of them, their mean degree centrality 
was higher than the average organization. Specifically, UNOCHA’s mean degree centrality is 0.534 at 
six months, while the average was only 0.346. At twelve months, UNOCHA’s mean degree centrality 
dropped to zero while the mean degree centrality dropped to 0.257. As this entity is a central 
organization in sharing information as a resource, and as information was the most common resource 
shared, its departure stressed communication avenues and left gaps in networks. Our analysis 
suggested that UNOCHA’s withdrawal is one of the reasons for the decrease of activity in information 
sharing.  
 
Figure 4: Impact of Institutional Support in Resource Coordination Networks 
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As illustrated by the combined resource network from the community 6 shown in Figure 4, the 
departure of UNOCHA changed the landscape for inter-organizational resource coordination. It is 
clearly observable that, after the withdrawal of UNOCHA, networks lost significant connections. 
Densities of these networks are also heavily impacted by UNOCHA’s leaving. This density drop 
equates to a 75% loss in connections after six months. In particular, this provides a strong argument 
for the need to allocate financial resources towards institutional mechanisms that support 
coordination. Despite the fact that initial planning had been completed, significant design and 
construction activities for infrastructure were still in progress during the twelve-month observation. 
One NGO worker said, “[Now] we just go directly to where there is a concern, unlike before that there was a forum.” 
The result was a transition from proactive prevention of clashes between work tasks to one that was 
reactive. In summary, our analysis shows that the departure of the UNOCHA and the cluster system 
decreased coordination within communities. Thus, while there have been concerted efforts to increase 
grassroots coordination efforts and decrease control within humanitarian organizations, this analysis 
suggests that some forms of formalized coordination and control are still necessary to enhance 
coordination between organizations.  
Program Duration and Organizational Presence 
While we have shown that networks become more decentralized over time and coordination tapers 
off, our analysis kept the number of organizations consistent at six and twelve months. As a result, it 
is important that we briefly discuss and examine the length of organizational programs in 
communities. Our analysis showed a 39% decrease in connected organizations, implying that 
organizations had either left, stopped coordinating, or were present but terminated communication. 
Isolated, or non-connected, organizations who were known to be active in a community through site 
observations, but who did not take part in coordination efforts, represent 10% of the isolated 
organizations at six months, and 3.5% at twelve months. Further, 10% of isolated programs started 
before six months and were completed prior to twelve months. This means that organizations carrying 
out these programs were considered as isolated actors at twelve months, even though their 
programming was complete by the second observation period. Finally, 4% of programs started after 
six months. These organizations are still included in the six month networks, but were not yet present 
in communities. These numbers highlight that most organizations were involved for the entirety of 
the twelve-month period studied. Analysis shows that 31% of organizations who remain present in 
community recovery efforts become isolated over time in the coordination networks. This confirms 
that organizations which decide to remain present in communities tend to terminate coordination 
efforts over time, which raises concerns as recovery progresses. 
Authority Shift 
One of the major themes that emerged from our analysis was the impact of staffing contracts on 
network changes. Among the 309 projects carried out in communities, 54% were run by organizations 
staffed by expatriates at six months. At twelve months, this percentage decreased to 30%. 
Organizations were considered as having expatriate staff if the origin of more than 50% of their 
workforce was identified as being non-local. When related to network density, analysis shows that 
communities with expatriate staff tend to have the densest networks at six months and face a larger 
decrease in density over time. On the other hand, these communities followed network trends similar 
to other communities when examining degree centralizations. It suggests that a shift from expatriates 
to locals does not impact the homogeneity of networks, but instead, impacts their densities. Our 
analysis further shows that at six months, the origin of the workforce does not impact their position 
in the network. In other words, actor centralities were not found to relate to network position of an 
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organization. The major shift, however, is that at twelve months, locally-staffed organizations become 
more central actors when compared to expatriate-staffed organizations.  
Authority shift impacted coordination, as at six months, expatriate staff were seen as more active at 
sharing resources and communicating more frequently, while at twelve months, the balance changed, 
and locally staffed organizations were more active. On-site observations further demonstrated the 
disconnect resulting from staffing changes as it was not uncommon that staff at twelve months were 
unaware of their organization’s past operations in a community. This gap in transitioning staff is one 
factor we believe explains the change of central organizations in network coordination over time. New 
staff need to recreate ties that may have been lost with other organizations and these connections may 
have been informal or undocumented. This transition supports why only 9% of central actors 
remained the same. This finding echoes calls from other network studies in humanitarian contexts to 
integrate local partners earlier in disaster recovery efforts (Holguín-Veras et al. 2012). In summary, we 
have discussed key changes in networks as well as potential causes for this shifts in order to answer 
our third research question which asked how post-disaster inter-organizational networks change 
during early recovery. 
Validity Checks 
Our validity checks support that our approach to qualitatively constructing networks was suitable. In 
comparing researcher generated networks with the sample of organizational surveys, we found 
disagreement ranging, on average, from 3% to 18% across communities. A summary of comparisons 
for each resource is presented in Table 4. From these results, it becomes obvious that the survey 
responses align well with the qualitatively constructed matrices based upon observation and interviews 
as the percentages of disagreement are low. The researcher constructed ties and organizational surveys 
tend to align more at twelve months than at six months. This may be because organizations were 
asked to report their six month activities at the same time they were asked about twelve month 
activities within the survey questionnaires, requiring them to retroactively remember their earlier 
activities. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the turnover of organization staff may have led to 
misinformed organizational responses. When analyzing survey responses, it appears that organizations 
mentioned higher rates of resource coordination than the researchers noticed on site. Despite limited 
disagreement between sources, however, both sources showed similar overall trends in resource 
coordination. The primary location of disagreement related to information resources, which may stem 
from one-time communication occurrences by an organization respondent, which was not observed 
by the researchers. 
Table 4: Data Validation 
 Material Human Information Finance 
 6 
months 
1 year 
6 
months 
1 year 
6 
months 
1 year 
6 
months 
1 year 
Mean Percentage 
of Disagreement 
6% 4% 4% 3% 18% 18% 7% 5% 
Standard 
Deviation 
9% 6% 7% 7% 13 % 20% 7% 6% 
 
Finally, discrepancies were observed within survey responses. Among them were discrepancies linked 
to resource sharing, as some respondents reported coordinating resources with an organization during 
a period when they had indicated earlier in the survey that the coordination with the organization had 
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already ended. These later responses were removed from the analysis on the basis that the initial 
question asked whether coordination still existed.  
Limitations 
While the researchers spent extensive time in the field collecting data on the presence of organizations 
in communities, there is still a potential that organizations were missed and thus excluded from 
networks. The absence of these organizations would result in incomplete networks, however, due to 
the multiple methods of data collection, it is unlikely that these entities played a significant role in 
reconstruction. Additionally, we intentionally selected to bound our networks at the community level. 
In reality, coordination extends beyond these limits and these social boundaries are fuzzy. Given that 
organizations themselves chose to define project limits at the community level we feel that our 
networks represent a practical basis for understanding coordination. 
Another limitation was the selection of six and twelve months as the points in time to study 
coordination. Recovery efforts are inherently dynamic and coordination changes follow this pattern. 
However, these points in time allowed us to investigate two significant stages: (1) after the transition 
from emergency services towards long-term provision service at six months and (2) after the transition 
out of cluster coordination at twelve months. The study of cluster departure was also based on the 
network presence, and absence, of UNOCHA. We used this organization as a proxy to study cluster 
impact as all reporting was handled through UNOCHA and individual clusters are better represented 
as networks rather than nodes within organizational networks. Further, our validation data at six 
months was collected through retrospective accounts from survey respondents. The lack of real time 
collection introduces potential error, but also allowed the researchers to better reflect on changes that 
occurred when creating networks.  
Lastly, our results are only from one hazard event and should be validated through future recovery 
efforts. The Philippines is a unique case given the large number of typhoons that occur annually. 
Despite the large awareness of disaster risk reduction, the international response that was elicited 
exhibits similarities seen in coordination to other subsequent responses.  
Conclusions 
In conclusion, our findings showed that information was the most frequently coordinated resource, 
followed by material, financial and human resources, answering our first research question. The 
documentation of coordination networks for different resources at two periods following a disaster 
helps us to better understand the types of resources that are coordinated more or less frequently to 
strategically identify coordination inefficiencies. For instance, human resources were coordinated least 
frequently, and were a source of tension within network structures, however, coordination of trained 
labor is frequently cited as important for building community resilience (Amaratunga and Ginige 
2011). Our findings also highlighted the important role of government agencies for facilitating long-
term coordination within communities and the detrimental shift in coordination when centralized 
control is removed. This answered our second question of who are the central actors in coordination 
networks, supporting past work that has showed government agencies are most commonly the central 
players (Kapucu et al. 2010b). Our qualitative data portrayed a different picture of these connections, 
however, showing that, in many cases, these relationships were weak in early recovery phases but 
flourished in later stages.  
One criticism of social network analysis presented in literature is its static nature, only depicting social 
structures at one point of time (Abbasi and Kapucu 2012). Our third and final research question 
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focused on the analysis of multiple coordination time periods, answering calls to examine how 
coordination networks change and evolve over time (Abbasi and Kapucu 2015). Our findings showed 
that networks become more decentralized over time, in stark contrast to past theory of emergency 
management which showed centralization and consolidation of networks. We hypothesize that this is 
a result of the time scales being investigated and encourage further study in this area. Methodologically, 
we have implemented and validated the use of qualitative data to construct networks. This presents 
new opportunities to use social network analysis as a means to study medium sized social groups. In 
the past, survey methods have rendered these networks difficult to examine given response rates and 
incomplete sampling of network actors. By using third party observation, greater consistency of link 
evaluations can be achieved without sacrificing the accuracy of these ties.  
Practically, we provided recommendations to organizations to enhance coordination and 
infrastructure delivery following disasters. In particular, our network analysis has shown the 
detrimental effects of short term expatriate contracts. Qualitatively, many NGO workers openly 
discussed their frustration with the current status quo and resources provided to the transitional period 
following emergency phases. Donors, in particular, should consider allocating sufficient time and 
funding to ensure that as local staff are hired by organizations, that resources are in place to ensure an 
efficient shift. It was observed that organizations with longer-term staff contracts had greater 
continuity in coordination. Extending traditional six month contracts to twelve months could also 
assist in bolstering coordination of aid organizations. In addition, our findings demonstrate that 
organizations seeking to gain access to information should seek out involvement in cluster 
coordination during early months of recovery and connect with government agencies.  
Future Work 
We have taken a first step towards understanding coordination networks that form at the community 
level and compared these networks across two points in time. To our knowledge, we conducted the 
first social network analysis of community level coordination networks following a hazard event. 
These coordination structures can be analyzed in the future with short and long-term recovery 
outcomes to determine the influence that coordination practice and structure had on resilience 
outcomes. Next steps should also continue to explore coordination at the community level through 
social network analysis, as we focused explicitly on organizational networks. New research should 
explore how these networks are similar to or contrast regional and national networks. There is also a 
need to explore individual networks to understand how community members interact and coordinate 
resources in recovery. Additional time periods can also assist our understanding of how networks 
evolve during different phases of reconstruction. Finally, it is essential that future research begin to 
link coordination processes to resilience outcomes of reconstruction efforts.  
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